Author: Joe

Previously in sequence: Skyscrapers and madmen; Why it can be OK to predictably lose; VNM, separability, and more This is the final essay in a four-part series on expected utility maximization (EUM). This part focus on theorems that aim to justify the subjective probability aspect of EUM, namely: Dutch Book theorems; Cox’s Theorem (this one… Continue reading On expected utility, part 4: Dutch books, Cox, and Complete Class →

Previously in sequence: Skyscrapers and madmen; Why it can be OK to predictably lose This is the third essay in a four-part series on expected utility maximization (EUM). This part examines three theorems/arguments that take probability assignments for granted, and derive a conclusion of the form: “If your choices satisfy XYZ conditions, then you act… Continue reading On expected utility, part 3: VNM, separability, and more →

Previously in sequence: Skyscrapers and madmen This is the second essay in a four-part series on expected utility maximization (EUM). This part focuses on why it can make sense, in cases like “save one life for certain, or 1000 with 1% chance,” to choose the risky option, and hence to “predictably lose.” The answer is… Continue reading On expected utility, part 2: Why it can be OK to predictably lose →

Summary: Suppose that you’re trying to do something. Maybe: get a job, or pick a restaurant, or raise money to pay medical bills. Some people think that unless you’re messing up in silly ways, you should be acting “as if” you’re maximizing expected utility – i.e., assigning consistent, real-numbered probabilities and utilities to the possible… Continue reading On expected utility, part 1: Skyscrapers and madmen →

“If Nature herself proves artificial, where will you go to seek wildness? Where is the real out-of-doors?” - C.S. Lewis (Content warning: weird) Summary: This post examines “simulation arguments” – i.e., arguments that we should assign significant probability to living in a computer simulation.  I distinguish between two types. The first type starts with our… Continue reading Simulation arguments →

And for all this, nature is never spent… -- Gerard Manley Hopkins Summary: Infinite ethics (i.e., ethical theory that considers infinite worlds) is important – both in theory and in practice. Infinite ethics puts serious pressure on various otherwise-plausible ethical principles (including some that underlie common arguments for “longtermism”). We know, from impossibility results, that… Continue reading On infinite ethics →

And you want to travel with her, and you want to travel blind And then you know that she will trust you For you've touched her perfect body with your mind  -- Leonard Cohen, “Suzanne” Non-naturalist normative realism claims that there are objective normative facts that are irreducibly “over and above” facts about the natural… Continue reading The ignorance of normative realism bot →

This is the second in a pair of posts examining whether morality falls out of instrumental rationality, if you do the game theory right. David Gauthier thinks the answer is yes. I focus on his view as an example of a broader tendency, to which I expect many of my comments to generalize. In my… Continue reading Morality and constrained maximization, part 2 →

Instrumental rationality is about achieving your goals. But morality, famously, sometimes demands that you don't. Suppose, for example, that you only want apples. Sometimes you might be in a position to steal apples, and get away with it, and know this. But morality still says: no. So are morality and instrumental rationality in conflict? A… Continue reading Morality and constrained maximization, part 1 →

(Content warning: especially niche topic.) Some readers of my recent sequence on anthropics suggested that I consider an approach that they find especially plausible -- namely, UDASSA (or the "Universal Distribution" plus the "Absolute Self-Sampling Assumption"). So, partly on this prompting, and partly from pre-existing interest, I spent some time learning about UDASSA, and talking… Continue reading Anthropics and the Universal Distribution →