(Content warning: especially niche topic.) Some readers of my recent sequence on anthropics suggested that I consider an approach that they find especially plausible -- namely, UDASSA (or the "Universal Distribution" plus the "Absolute Self-Sampling Assumption"). So, partly on this prompting, and partly from pre-existing interest, I spent some time learning about UDASSA, and talking… Continue reading Anthropics and the Universal Distribution
On the Universal Distribution
A number of people I know are excited about a type of fundamental prior known as the “Universal Distribution” (UD). In particular, they’re excited about using this prior to address questions about anthropics. I discuss the application to anthropics in a later post. As a foundation for that post, though, I wanted to first lay… Continue reading On the Universal Distribution
SIA > SSA, part 4: In defense of the presumptuous philosopher
Previously in sequence: Part 1: Learning from the fact that you exist; Part 2: Telekinesis, reference classes, and other scandals; Part 3: An aside on betting in anthropics. This post is the last in a four-part sequence, explaining why I think that one prominent approach to anthropic reasoning (the “Self-Indication Assumption” or “SIA”) is better than… Continue reading SIA > SSA, part 4: In defense of the presumptuous philosopher
SIA > SSA, part 3: An aside on betting in anthropics
Previously in sequence: Part 1: Learning from the fact that you exist; Part 2: Telekinesis, reference classes, and other scandals. This post is the third in a four-part sequence, explaining why I think that one prominent approach to anthropic reasoning (the “Self-Indication Assumption” or “SIA”) is better than another (the “Self-Sampling Assumption” or “SSA”). This part… Continue reading SIA > SSA, part 3: An aside on betting in anthropics
SIA > SSA, part 2: Telekinesis, reference classes, and other scandals
Previously in sequence: SIA > SSA, part 1: Learning from the fact that you exist. This post is the second in a four-part series, explaining why I think that one prominent approach to anthropic reasoning (the “Self-Indication Assumption” or “SIA”) is better than another (the “Self-Sampling Assumption” or “SSA”). This part focuses on objections to… Continue reading SIA > SSA, part 2: Telekinesis, reference classes, and other scandals
SIA > SSA, part 1: Learning from the fact that you exist
This post is the first in a four-part sequence explaining why I think that one prominent approach to anthropic reasoning is better than another. Consider: God’s extreme coin toss: You wake up alone in a white room. There’s a message written on the wall: “I, God, tossed a fair coin. If it came up heads,… Continue reading SIA > SSA, part 1: Learning from the fact that you exist
Can you control the past?
I think that you can “control” events you have no causal interaction with, including events in the past, and that this is a wild and disorienting fact, with uncertain but possibly significant implications. This post attempts to impart such disorientation. My main example is a prisoner's dilemma between perfect deterministic software twins, exposed to the… Continue reading Can you control the past?
In search of benevolence (or: what should you get Clippy for Christmas?)
Suppose that you aspire to promote the welfare of others in a roughly impartial way, at least in some parts of your life. This post examines a dilemma that such an aspiration creates, especially given subjectivism about meta-ethics. If you don’t use idealized preference-satisfaction as your theory of welfare, your "helping someone" often ends up… Continue reading In search of benevolence (or: what should you get Clippy for Christmas?)
On the limits of idealized values
On a popular view about meta-ethics, what you should value is determined by what an idealized version of you would value. Call this view “idealizing subjectivism.” Idealizing subjectivism has been something like my best-guess meta-ethics. And lots of people I know take it for granted. But I also feel nagged by various problems with it… Continue reading On the limits of idealized values
Problems of evil
I. I wasn't raised in a religious household, but I got interested in Buddhism at the end of high school, and in Christianity and a number of other traditions, early in college. Those were the days of the New Atheists, and of intricate wrangling over theistic apologetics. And I did some of that. I went,… Continue reading Problems of evil