And you want to travel with her, and you want to travel blind And then you know that she will trust you For you've touched her perfect body with your mind -- Leonard Cohen, “Suzanne” Non-naturalist normative realism claims that there are objective normative facts that are irreducibly “over and above” facts about the natural… Continue reading The ignorance of normative realism bot
Morality and constrained maximization, part 2
This is the second in a pair of posts examining whether morality falls out of instrumental rationality, if you do the game theory right. David Gauthier thinks the answer is yes. I focus on his view as an example of a broader tendency, to which I expect many of my comments to generalize. In my… Continue reading Morality and constrained maximization, part 2
Morality and constrained maximization, part 1
Instrumental rationality is about achieving your goals. But morality, famously, sometimes demands that you don't. Suppose, for example, that you only want apples. Sometimes you might be in a position to steal apples, and get away with it, and know this. But morality still says: no. So are morality and instrumental rationality in conflict? A… Continue reading Morality and constrained maximization, part 1
Anthropics and the Universal Distribution
(Content warning: especially niche topic.) Some readers of my recent sequence on anthropics suggested that I consider an approach that they find especially plausible -- namely, UDASSA (or the "Universal Distribution" plus the "Absolute Self-Sampling Assumption"). So, partly on this prompting, and partly from pre-existing interest, I spent some time learning about UDASSA, and talking… Continue reading Anthropics and the Universal Distribution
On the Universal Distribution
A number of people I know are excited about a type of fundamental prior known as the “Universal Distribution” (UD). In particular, they’re excited about using this prior to address questions about anthropics. I discuss the application to anthropics in a later post. As a foundation for that post, though, I wanted to first lay… Continue reading On the Universal Distribution
SIA > SSA, part 4: In defense of the presumptuous philosopher
Previously in sequence: Part 1: Learning from the fact that you exist; Part 2: Telekinesis, reference classes, and other scandals; Part 3: An aside on betting in anthropics. This post is the last in a four-part sequence, explaining why I think that one prominent approach to anthropic reasoning (the “Self-Indication Assumption” or “SIA”) is better than… Continue reading SIA > SSA, part 4: In defense of the presumptuous philosopher
SIA > SSA, part 3: An aside on betting in anthropics
Previously in sequence: Part 1: Learning from the fact that you exist; Part 2: Telekinesis, reference classes, and other scandals. This post is the third in a four-part sequence, explaining why I think that one prominent approach to anthropic reasoning (the “Self-Indication Assumption” or “SIA”) is better than another (the “Self-Sampling Assumption” or “SSA”). This part… Continue reading SIA > SSA, part 3: An aside on betting in anthropics
SIA > SSA, part 2: Telekinesis, reference classes, and other scandals
Previously in sequence: SIA > SSA, part 1: Learning from the fact that you exist. This post is the second in a four-part series, explaining why I think that one prominent approach to anthropic reasoning (the “Self-Indication Assumption” or “SIA”) is better than another (the “Self-Sampling Assumption” or “SSA”). This part focuses on objections to… Continue reading SIA > SSA, part 2: Telekinesis, reference classes, and other scandals
SIA > SSA, part 1: Learning from the fact that you exist
This post is the first in a four-part sequence explaining why I think that one prominent approach to anthropic reasoning is better than another. Consider: God’s extreme coin toss: You wake up alone in a white room. There’s a message written on the wall: “I, God, tossed a fair coin. If it came up heads,… Continue reading SIA > SSA, part 1: Learning from the fact that you exist
Can you control the past?
I think that you can “control” events you have no causal interaction with, including events in the past, and that this is a wild and disorienting fact, with uncertain but possibly significant implications. This post attempts to impart such disorientation. My main example is a prisoner's dilemma between perfect deterministic software twins, exposed to the… Continue reading Can you control the past?